A Practical Roadmap For 'Deal of The Century'?
By Gilead Sher, Daniel Cohen
As a potential “Deal of the Century,” President Donald Trump’s “Peace to Prosperity” plan does not live up to its name. It falls well short of an ultimate deal that will break the Israeli-Palestinian gridlock and equitably resolve the conflict. It is more accurately a continuation of previous interim agreements—essentially, an Oslo C—but with a significant departure from past negotiation understandings.The truly innovative components of the deal bend unabashedly toward Israeli desires, without compensatory elements for Palestinian aspirations. The distortion of internal balances previously established in other U.S. frameworks seems detrimental to promoting peace or regional security.
Previous negotiations have recognized a distinction between the main Jewish settlement blocs near the pre-1967 Green Line and more isolated Jewish settlements in the heart of the West Bank, but Trump’s plan allows for Israeli annexation of all Jewish settlements. Though the Clinton Parameters recognized the significance of the Jordan Valley to Israeli security and would have created a six-year plan for Israeli withdrawal from it, Trump’s plan offers Israel political sovereignty over the Jordan Valley.
The plan envisions Israeli control of the Palestinian state’s airspace, sea, and electromagnetic spectrum, as well as all borders and crossing points. There are also no concessions for Palestinian sovereignty over any part of the Old City or the Temple Mount, eliciting further Palestinian scorn for the plan. Both stipulations disregard carefully crafted compromises from former negotiations—the Oslo process, Camp David, and Annapolis—which offered detailed sovereignty-sharing proposals and special security arrangements.Even worse, while the Trump plan licenses Israel to initiate annexation without any preconditions, Palestinian statehood is conditioned upon a compilation of unreasonable and impractical thresholds— all but assuring Palestinian failure.
It is worth noting that while the plan has not received strong Arab support, neither has it been rejected as strongly as the Palestinians might wish. The Arab League has dismissed the peace plan as insufficient for Palestinian independence; nevertheless, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have all issued statements tepidly welcoming Trump’s proposal and calling for negotiations. In the past, a plan like this would have received resounding criticism from all Arab parties. Today, with shifting Middle East alliances and threats—i.e., Iran—moderate Sunni states are concerned with displeasing Trump and are increasingly open to establishing relations with Israel.
At the very least, Trump’s plan serves as a harsh reminder to the Palestinians that time is not in their favor. Yet, this should not deceive Israelis into thinking time is on their side. The Trump plan could harden the Israeli center-right to tolerate fewer compromises in future negotiations, enter a new potential spoiler into the IsraeliPalestinian peace process, and lead Israel down a perilous path to international demonization and social upheaval.
Though it is unfortunate for both sides, the Trump plan will shape the negotiation process for years to come—regardless of the results of the U.S. 2020 presidential elections. It will serve as a point of reference in future negotiations for those strongly in favor of it and those staunchly opposed, just as many other plans in the wastebasket of history have continued to influence the peace process. Since all parties involved will undoubtedly bear the consequences of the Peace to Prosperity plan, it is worth examining the implementation issues and the proposed framework, as well as how Israelis, Palestinians, and Arab states can navigate the negotiation process.
Of course, the Covid-19 pandemic has placed many foreign policy issues on hold as the world copes with the health crisis. This will not erase the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor the problems of the Trump plan. Rather, once the pandemic has subsided, the geopolitical challenges facing the Middle East will resurface, amplified. Then, perhaps all parties involved can utilize the postCovid-19 years to attempt resolving—or at least subduing—issues critical to the resolution of the conflict.